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Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. Dist., 127 S.Ct. 1994 (2007). The Supreme
Court held that under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), parents have independent,
enforceable rights. As such, they are entitled to prosecute
IDEA claims on their own behalf. The Winkelmans filed
suit against the District claiming their son Jacob,
who had
been diagnosed with Autism, had been denied a free
appropriate public education (FAPE). After losing at
both the impartial
due process hearing and at the State Level Review,
the Winkelmans filed suit on their own behalf and on
behalf
of their son in Federal District Court. The District
Court also ruled in favor of the District and the Winkelmans
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit, relying on its decision in Cavanaugh
v. Cardinal Local School District, dismissed the appeal
as the Winkelmans failed to obtain counsel to represent
Jacob. According to the Sixth Circuit Court, the IDEA
did
not permit nonlawyer parents to proceed pro se in federal
court, and the right to a FAPE “’belongs to
the child alone,’ not to both the parents and the
child.” The decision of the Sixth Circuit caused
disagreement among the Circuit Courts, so the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case. On review, the Supreme Court held
that “parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative
stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights
in federal court.” One of the stated purposes of
the IDEA is to “ensure that the rights of children
with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20
U.S.C. §1400(d)(1)(B). Based upon this language, the
Court determined that the word “rights” refers
not only to the rights of the child, but also to the rights
of parents. The Court interpreted the statute to mean, “that
the IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents
as well as to children.” Accordingly, parents
are entitled to prosecute claims on their own behalf.
The Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. |
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Bd. of Educ. v.
L.M., as legal guardian of T.D., 478 F.3d 307 (6th
Cir. 2007). The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination
regarding the extent of the District’s IDEA violations,
but held the process of imposing the remedy was in error.
T.D. is a child with ADHD and a reading disability who
was not identified for special education services until
the conclusion of his fourth grade year, even though he
exhibited behavioral and academic problems as early as
kindergarten. Based on the District’s delay, his
guardian filed for a due process hearing against the District.
At the Due Process hearing, the hearing officer determined
T.D. had been denied a FAPE. As a remedy, the hearing officer
awarded T.D. compensatory education in the form of 125
hours of one-on-one instruction in reading and language
skills. On appeal, however, the Appeals Board held that
T.D.’s compensatory education should have been determined
and prepared by the child’s IEP team. Both parties
appealed through the Federal District Court and later presented
arguments to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth
Circuit upheld the determination that T.D. did not receive
a FAPE during the 1999-2000 and 2000-01 school years, and
that T.D. was not wrongfully denied ESY services for the
summer of 2002. The court did, however, determine that
the Appeal Board’s compensatory education award was
in error. As noted by the court, “an appropriate
award of compensatory education is ‘relief designed
to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within
the meaning of IDEA.’” (quoting Parents of
Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489
(9th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that “neither
a hearing officer nor an Appeals Board may delegate to
a child’s IEP team the power to reduce or terminate
a compensatory-education award.” |
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Hjortness by Hjortness
v. Neenah Joint School District, 48 IDELR 119 (7th
Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit
held in favor of the District in ruling that an IEP
was reasonably calculated to provide a student with
some meaningful
educational benefit and that minor procedural violations
did not rise to the level of a denial of a FAPE. The
student attended school in his public school district
until May
2003. While Joel attended private school during the
2003-04 school year, the District reevaluated Joel
and convened
the IEP team, including Joel’s mother. At that time,
only one specific IEP goal was discussed even though others
were generally mentioned. After this meeting, the District
prepared Joel’s IEP which resulted in four specified
goals. These goals were identical to the previous year’s
goals, except that percentages were lowered and the short-term
objectives under each goal varied from the prior IEP’s
short term objectives. The parents then filed for a due
process hearing claiming the District denied Joel a FAPE.
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit determined the proposed
IEP was substantively appropriate as the District considered
Joel’s various medical diagnoses and educational
assessments in determining his special needs. Additionally,
the District had gathered current information from Joel’s
private school and also observed his program. Accordingly,
the court determined the District’s IEP would
have provided Joel with some educational benefit. The
court
also determined that any procedural violations committed
by the District did not rise to the level of a denial
of a FAPE as they did not result in the loss of educational
opportunities. |
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Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch.
Dist., 480 F.Supp.2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The District
Court upheld a hearing officer’s
ruling that the District denied a FAPE to J.D. The court,
however, reversed the award of reimbursement to J.D.’s
mother for expenses associated with providing tutoring
for J.D. and found the hearing officer’s cap of $15,000
for compensatory education arbitrary. In upholding the
hearing officer’s determination that J.D. was denied
a FAPE, the court cited the facts that J.D.’s IEPs
were not based upon current, accurate information as they
were developed from an evaluation more than four years
old. Additionally, after confirming J.D.’s reading
difficulties, the District did not begin to provide reading
assistance until 9 months later. The IEP team also continued
the use of a specific reading program despite knowledge
that J.D. was not receiving educational benefit from its
use. Further, without documenting and reviewing progress
in math, the District would be incapable of designing an
IEP tailored to meet J.D.’s unique needs. Finally,
the court noted that J.D. failed to master skills on his
IEP and that the goals and objectives were identical to
the prior IEPs. Based upon these findings, the court upheld
the hearing officer’s ruling that J.D. was denied
a FAPE for three school years. The Court, however, found
that the record did not support the hearing officer’s
award of reimbursement for tutoring expenses as there was
a lack of documentary evidence. Accordingly, the court
agreed that J.D. was entitled to compensatory education,
but disagreed with the hearing officer’s ruling that
$15,000 would serve as a cap to the amount the District
would have to pay. Instead, the court ruled that the award “must
compensate and provide J.D. with the educational benefits
APS should have provided to J.D. in the first place.” Accordingly,
the District was ordered to pay for the full cost of
providing compensatory education. |
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